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In effect, I am being offered to your 
salivating fangs as a proponent of what 
some have labeled a big, blooming, 
buzzing confusion-international law. 
I'm reminded that the philosopher 
Hobbes had told us that man is the only 
beast that preys on its own kind. Now, 
this morning, in order to present the 
narrowest possible target to your com-
bined attacks-80 percent of the world's 
fighting power is represented here this 
morning in the persons of the U.S. 
Armed Forces and those 31 friendly 
nations-I wish to define the terms used 
in the topic for today's lecture which is 
"The Role of International Law in the 
World Community." 
I do so because it is important in this 
introductory lecture to the course on 
international law that we proceed 
directly to the ultimate fundamentals. 
Let me, therefore, tum first to the two 
words "world community" and suggest 
to you that as a lawyer for whom 
international law has long been a source 
of livelihood, I have some doubts 
whether one can profitably use this 
term "world community." The political 
scientist, the economist, the sociologist 
-all can accept this expression with 
greater ease than can the lawyer who 
must compete in a world of adversaries. 
I would propose that for today we 
substitute for this phrase the words 
"world arena." The expression "world 
community" implies a plurality of states 
and nations drawn by common interests 
into collaborative and structural rela-
tionships to each other promoted by 
international organizations. In fact, 
reality is much closer to a scenario in 
which highly autonomous and competi-
tive states seek aggressively to advance 
and defensively to protect what each 
deems to be its national objectives 
through reciprocity rather than com-
munion of interests. In this arena the 
actors are states, with international or-
ganizations largely reduced to the role 
of disapproving spectators. 
Let me go into this matter a little 
more thoroughly, yet briefly, I hope. I 
suggest that if we look at the United 
Nations, a moment's reflection would 
reveal that the General Assembly can 
take no decisions in this world scenario 
apart from internal housekeeping 
arrangements. It can make only recom-
mendations. You will recall that 
recently Israel was severely reproved at 
the General Assembly for declaring that 
she would refuse to recognize the reso-
lutions on Jerusalem voted in June of 
this year. But the criticism emerged 
precisely from those states that 20 years 
ago had adopted exactly the same posi-
tion declaring that they utterly rejected 
the United Nations resolutions relating 
to the admission of Israel. The U.S.S.R. 
has adopted a similar attitude on other 
questions as had indeed, on occasion, 
the United States itself. 
Now, with regard to the Security 
Council you are aware of the veto 
power, and certainly the United States 
is bound by nothing in substance at the 
Security Council which we do not wish 
to be bound by. 
You may say, "Let us leave this 
problem aside; is it not a fact that the 
United Nations operates as a world 
community? How about these U.N. 
Forces in the Congo, Cyprus, Yemen, et 
cctcra?" However, if we look at the 
present structure of the United Nations 
we can see that here the contributions 
are on a state-to-state basis. The U.N. 
operations in Yemen and Cyprus are 
supported not by the United Nations 
but individually and voluntarily only by 
those states which choose to participate. 
"Well," you may say, "how about 
the International Court of Justice?" I 
would suggest that the same conclusion 
obtains. No state may be bound 01.' 
hauled before it without its consent. 
Now it is true that under article 36 of 
the Statute of the Court the United 
States has recognized the so-called com-
pulsory jurisdiction of that tribunal. But 
it is also true that we have adopted what 
is called the Connolly Amendment 
which reserves to the United States the 
sole determination as to what is a 
domestic matter, which means that the 
United States alone decides whether it 
should submit to the jurisdiction of that 
Court. This again is a form of veto not 
unlike that which we enjoy in the 
Security Council. This formula has 
proved so attractive to the rest of the 
world that where it has not been liter-
ally adopted elsewhere it has been ex-
tended by the Court through reci-
procity. The result is that, with but two 
exceptions at this moment, there are no 
cases before the Court. 
"Well," YOll may say, "how about 
other areas? How about the European 
Economic Community and its Interna-
tional Court?" Again the same conclu-
sion probably obtains. The cases are still 
not convincing that the Court of the 
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European Community enjoys the right 
to pronounce judgments binding on the 
member states. I am prepared to admit 
that in the Van Gand case some argu-
ment could be advanced to that effect. 
But, by and large, this is not the case. 
Much has been made of the European 
Court of Human Rights and the right of 
an individual to bring. there a complaint 
against one's own government for viola-
tion of human rights. However, article 
25 of the Treaty establishing that Court 
requires the advance consent of the 
state to get a case there. 
What about other areas? Let me just 
mention one other point, and with this I 
return to the United Nations. One of the 
most fundamental articles, if not the 
most fundamental article of the Charter, 
is article 51-self-defense. And as you 
know, in national law (we international 
lawyers frequently call it municipal law) 
self-defense is a privilege reserved clearly 
in its first stage to the personal and 
subjective assessment by the individual 
that his life is imminently threatened. 
True, the courts may ultimately, in a 
second stage, decide that there was no 
legitimate basis for sensing such a threat. 
However, in the case of states and self-
defense under article 51 of the Charter 
there is, practically speaking, no such 
second stage. Just as with the individual, 
the state, according to article 51, clearly 
has the initial determination as to 
whether or not it may act in self-defense. 
And where is the second stage, that of 
adjudication? Adjudication is made, not 
by the International Court of Justice, but 
by the Security Council. The right of 
self-defense as determined by the individ-
ual state under article 51 remains in force 
until the Security Council takes a deci-
sion one way or the other. Yet, once 
again the veto comes into play. The five 
great powers will invariably exercise the 
veto privilege either in their own behalf 
or that of their clients, and so a decision 
will never be taken on this point, and the 
original unilateral determination will re-
main in force. 
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Aside from custom, what about 
specific international legislatior. in the 
form of multilateral treaties? Let me, 
for lack of time, dredge up multilateral 
conventions in maritime matters such as 
the North Sea Fisheries, the North 
Atlantic Fisheries, the Northwest Pacific 
Fisheries, the Safety of Life at Sea, 
Rules of the Road, and the Pollution 
Conventions. What happens here? In 
every case the execution and administra-
tion are reserved, not for international 
organizations, but for the states them-
selves. Thus, in the face of sovereign 
states we are confronted in ultimate 
analysis with a world arena rather than a 
world community. 
What I am trying to say up to this 
point is that we still have to deal 
essentially with an adversative system of 
autonomous states, and with such a 
scenario it is hard to talk about an 
international community except in re-
spect of the slow accretion of custom 
which, by and large, is more concerned 
with generalities than with hard preci-
sion. It is easier to talk about an 
international arena. 
In this situation, what can we con-
clude? Well, before we decide anything I 
would suggest that we ask ourselves why 
we have a situation of this sort. Partly it 
is, of course, an inheritance from the 
past when there were few international 
organizations. I do not deny that im-
p ortan t international organizations 
exist, but what I am suggesting is that 
from the point of view of international 
law they remain peripheral to state 
enforcement. I say this despite the fact 
that, as undoubtedly many of you, I 
have myself spent many years at the 
United Nations. 
There are, however, two more funda-
mental explanations of the situation 
linked to the nuclear era in which we 
are living. The first is a situation so 
familiar to all of you that I need not 
belabor it-namely, that the great world 
powers are locked in a nuclear stale-
mate. Now a nuclear stalemate means 
that from the point of view of or-
ganizing an international community, of 
organizing security, we are not pre-
pared, we are psychologically as well as 
militarily unprepared, to commit our 
very existence to a legal obligation. As 
former Secretary of State Acheson has 
observed, "The survival of states is not a 
matter of law." Now, if this is the case, 
is it not difficult to move into an era of 
effective, indeed, even legally valid 
alliances? I would suggest that it is, and 
if we do not have alliances, how again 
can we talk of an international com-
munity? Talk of arena? Yes. 
Let me illustrate this briefly, first by 
the Vietnam situation. Here we-that is 
to say, sometimes the Government, 
sometimes the press, sometimes public 
groups-have frequently said, "We are in 
Vietnam in execution of our SEATO 
obligations. "I suggest that we are not in 
Vietnam in execution of our SEATO 
obligations. I referred a moment ago to 
article 51, the gut article of the Charter, 
I would propose that we are in Vietnam 
on other grounds including that of 
collective self-defense. However that 
may be, let us look at the essential 
article of SEATO, which is article 4. 
Article 4 says this: "Each party recog-
nizes that aggression by means of an 
armed attack in the treaty area ... 
would endanger its own peace and 
safety, and agrees that it will in that 
event act to meet the common danger in 
accordance with its constitutional 
processes." Is that an obligation? Most 
certainly it is not! Again, in the world 
arena of adversative states we have 
carefully reserved to ourselves freedom 
of ultimate unilateral decision. This 
language exposes the nuclear stalemate. 
This is not an alliance, it is a declaration 
of independence. 
Let me mention another aspect of 
the same problem. In the days of the 
League, enormous importance was 
attached to the concept of collective 
security which is the automatic obliga-
tion to apply force upon a call for the 
same by the collective organization. 
This was the contribution of the League 
of Nations to world peace. From my 
experience at the United Nations, dating 
from the San Francisco Conference 
itself, I can testify as well to the 
frequency with which this concept was 
discussed in the first decade of the 
United Nations. But today, gentlemen, 
do we hear about collective security? I 
would suggest we do not. It was none 
other t1lan Adlai Stevenson, our dis-
tinguished Representative for so many 
years at the United Nations, who, a few 
months before his death, said this: "The 
truth is tIlat the best hope for peace 
with justice does not lie in the United 
Nations. Indeed the truth is almost 
exactly the reverse ...• Until the inter-
national community"-you can see he 
let me down-"is ready to rescue the 
victims, there is no alternative to na-
tional power. " 
So far I have been speaking of the 
nuclear stalemate of the great world 
powers. This is the first of the two more 
deeply fundamental reasons why we are 
living in a world arena rather tIlan a 
world community. Let me now turn to 
the second cause, and at this point I am 
talking about the mid de-sized and the 
small states. Here we encounter another 
phenomenon of the nuclear era, a devel-
opment which, for lack of a better way 
of tagging it, I choose to call "the 
inversion of power." Now, what do I 
mean? I mean simply what the Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom re-
marked several years ago, namely, that 
the nuclear stalemate between the great 
powers implies added freedom of action 
on the part of the middle-ranking and 
small states. Because of the reluctance 
of the great powers to intervene, the 
smaller states have obtained an im-
punity for their actions that had not 
previously been possible. This has 
greatly increased the proliferation of 
aggressions and conflicts among the 
small and particularly the developing 
states of the world. I would suggest that 
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if we look at the world scene this 
conclusion rather authoritatively im-
poses itself. How about 1956 and the 
Suez crisis? How about the Suez crisis 
of today? How, indeed, about the Viet-
nam conflict? Does not this conflict 
constitute an illustration of botll the 
nuclear stalemate and the inversion of 
power? 
There is another area in which I 
would suggest that tIlis inversion of 
power is manifested. The 19th century 
saw the progressive disappearance of 
independent states; for example, the 
Kingdoms of Burma and Madagascar 
were both conquered and disappeared as 
independent states. Today they have 
reappeared on the world scene. I do not 
suggest that the inversion of power is 
solely responsible for this reappearance, 
but I do submit that it has made it far 
easier for the renascent and newly 
emerged states to maintain their inde-
pendence and freedom of maneuver. 
This independence is accompanied by a 
great sensitivity to all that concerns 
sovereignty and freedom of choice. So 
we have, on the one hand, the great 
powers of the world locked in nuclear 
stalemate and the middle and small 
states, thanks to inversion of power, 
profiting from a freedom of action that 
previously had not been available. The 
combined effect of the nuclear stale-
mate and the inversion of power has 
been to prevent tile nuclear powers 
from ignoring the small states and to 
afford the latter freedom of maneuver 
far beyond the limits of their actual 
physical power. Thus tile world be-
comes an arena rather than a com-
munity, an arena crowded with giant, 
middle-sized, and dwarf states, all com-
petitive if not combative, with interna-
tional organizations playing largely the 
role of mostly disapproving spectators. 
At the same time we cannot ignore 
the almost stupendous disparity be-
tween the real physical strengths of the 
nuclear giants and those of the re-
emerged and emerging states. There is, 
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in consequence, a deep-seated and all-
pervasive cleavage of interests and 
claims as between the great and the 
small states-a dichotomy to which it 
will be necessary to return .. 
So much, then, for the first part of 
my remarks-it is the world arena of 
competitive and combative states rather 
than a world community that consti-
tutes one of the ultimate fundamentals 
of our problem. 
I now come to the term "interna-
tional law." How can we confidently 
assert that in such a world arena intern a-
tionallaw could play any role? 
We are, of course, faced with the 
initial question as to what is law. Saint 
Augustine is alleged to have said that if 
he were asked what "time" is he would 
reply, "Yes, I know perfectly well what 
'time' is, but I can't tell you what it is." 
Do we not have this question with law? 
What, then, is law? 
There are many criteria one might 
try to apply. Let me briefly suggest 
some of them. Many say that it is the 
command of the sovereign, and since 
international law can reveal no such 
sovereign command, it is not law. Well, 
this does not help us in the final 
analysis. In terms of our national law, 
we arrive ultimately at the Constitution. 
It is the sovereign, whether a king or the 
people, that grants the Constitution, 
and what is the Constitution? It is 
essentially a series of restrictions on the 
freedom of that sovereign. How, then, 
can the sovereign command a limitation 
upon himself? Yet that is exactly what 
we-the people who are the sovereign in 
the United States-are doing with the 
first 10, the 14th, and other amend-
ments to the Constitution, are we not? 
So I do not think that the concept of 
command is extremely helpful to us in 
proving that international law is not 
law. 
Now, it is said that since interna-
tional law has neither legislature nor the 
threat of compulsory recourse to courts 
that characterize national law, it cannot 
be considered law. I am going to pass 
over the question of legislature. I do so, 
in part, because the answer is here more 
or less apparent, and, secondly, because 
I do think that democratic processes or 
participation in law-making is largely 
irrelevant as a criterion of any law, be it 
national or international. 
Let us turn then to the judiciary. I 
suppose if we come back to the funda-
mentals the requirement of resort to 
courts is not helpful to us in deter-
mining whether or not legal norms are 
involved. Professor Chayes reminds us 
of the situation that arose in the closing 
months of the Eisenhower Administra-
tion. You will perhaps recall that Con-
gress at that time called upon the White 
House to deliver over certain highly 
secret documents, and the President 
refused to transfer those documents. 
Could Congress have cited President 
Eisenhower before the Supreme or any 
other Court? There is no remedy be-
tween the branches of the Government 
for accomplishing any thing of the sort. 
One branch may not sue another branch. 
We come now to what I'm sure 
you're all thinking of-sanctions. Law is 
an order backed by the threat of force, 
and if international law has no sanction 
it is not law. Well, l am going to suggest 
that international law does have sanc-
tions, and indeed a very important 
sanction which ties in directly with this 
concept that I have been laying before 
you-the adversative autonomy of 
states. But more of this later. First, let 
us look at sanction as a threat of force. 
It is by no means certain that such a 
sanction is a criteria of law. All of you 
gentlemen belong to a highly sophisti-
cated and integrated community-the 
military community. Now I would ask 
you: How many of you respect military 
law because of the threat of force? I 
would suggest you obey it because of 
your respect for authority within the 
community and of your demand that 
your own authority be respected by 
those subordinate to you. Moreover, a 
great deal of our own municipal law, 
our national law, is irrelevant in terms 
of any sanction. Much of our law, 
perhaps most of it, is concerned with 
determining privileges and procedures. 
For example, to what extent would you 
say that sanction is important to Medi-
care legislation? I would think only to a 
very minor degree. Viewed in terms of 
actual application of sanctions, interna-
tional law fares no worse than do other 
branches of the law. Are we today in 
position to declare that the pandemic of 
violence in the urban centers of the 
United States, as indeed abroad, and as 
evidenced by the President's recent 
appeal to abandon and disorder, 
signifies that national state, and munici-
pal law do not exist? 
Finally, it is said that international 
law is not law because so much of it is 
dominated by politics. Yet, would you 
be prepared to assert that the laws 
enacted by our Congressmen and 
Senators are not transcendently domi-
nated by politics? Could one assert that 
military science and doctrine are un-
important in the war in Vietnam be-
cause political considerations play no 
small role in decisions as to strategy, 
tactics, and deployments including 
bombing? 
If we may then take it that intern a-
tionallaw can and should be considered 
as fulfilling the requirements and cri-
teria of law, the next question is: "Why, 
in this world arena of adversary states, 
should we use law at all instead of force 
and threats of force? Are not the latter 
far more effective and therefore more 
economical than efforts to apply rules 
of law? Why should we not shoot our 
way through problems?" Is not this 
logical? 
Well here, gentlemen, I must confess 
tl13t I would like to introduce another 
model. I have talked about the world 
arena rather than a world community. A 
second model, for my part, is what 
Wohlstetter and others have called the 
"Great World" concept, as distinguished 
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from that of the "Small World." Some 
of you may remember that a decade ago 
there was a great deal of talk of the 
small world. Sophistication of transpor-
tation and communications had shrunk 
the world. I would suggest, on the 
contrary, that these capabilities and this 
array of resources and equipment have, 
within the context of application of 
military strength and other measures of 
force, had the effect of expanding 
rather than reducing the apparent 
world. Far be it from me, a civilian, to 
suggest to you, technicians and profes-
sionals, that distance is unimportant 
today in solving problems of missile 
firing or logistics. If so, why is it that 
orbiting satellites and hundreds of mili-
tary and scientific personnel are con-
stantly engaged in the excruciatingly 
precise computations required for re-
fining down in the last foot the exact 
distances that separate missile launching 
sites from possible targets? With regard 
to logistics, possibly 20 years ago we 
might not have been able to meet the 
logistic challenges of a Vietnam opera-
tion which still remain of herculean 
proportions and of staggering costs. So, 
even today it is not always feasible to 
shoot our way through. There are also 
the political considerations. Reflect, for 
example, on the Congo airdrops of 1963 
and 1967. Can we say that these were 
useful or highly effective operations? 
I was in the Middle East in 1956 at 
the time of the first Suez crisis and 
recall that those elements of the Egyp-
tian population that were the most 
articulate in their opposition to the 
French and British landings were not 
the Egyptians, but precisely the French 
and the British residents. They knew 
perfectly well what they were faced 
with. No matter how swiftly their own 
national forces moved, they could not 
arrive in time to protect them or their 
properties. 
Given this great world model, we 
cannot go around shooting our way 
through problems. Even a gangster state 
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has at some point to establish rules if 
only to economize the costs of the 
shooting it would otherwise have to 
resort to. At some stage the virtues of 
predictability and orderliness become 
imperative. We have to have our Status 
of Armed Forces Agreements, otherwise 
overseas operations would be out of the 
question. We have to go on the basis 
that we must know, for example, when 
you are sent abroad that you are not 
going to be subjected by a foreign 
government to an income tax every time 
you set foot on its soil. We have to have 
some rules established on a basis of 
reasonable expectations-the expecta-
tions that states can obtain, regularly, 
recognition from others of their claims 
under international law. Such claims as 
do receive recognition are called rights. 
There is also the counterpart, namely, 
an acknowledgment by other states that 
if such rights are denied the injured 
state may take action to enforce them. 
So, in effect, we are saying that 
international law is like national law. 
You go to your lawyer to find out what 
you can claim-indeed get away with-
and what you cannot claim, and what 
will be the consequences, often totally 
unperceived by the layman, of pressing 
legal or illegal claims. Thus international 
law, as all law, is concerned with ascer-
taining and demonstrating in the light of 
practice those claims which can be 
pressed as rights without violating 
expectations established in the interna-
tional arena and those which could be 
pressed only against the expectations of 
adversary states. Where a threat or an 
attempt is made in the international 
arena to deny a right, a secondary right 
arises for the injured state to undertake 
the enforcement of the primary right. 
This we did during the recent threat to 
freedom of navigation in the Red Sea by 
sending a eVA through after the genera-
tion of the threat. 
Thus international law, the law of 
this world arena of adversary states, like 
all law has its sanctions, sanctions at 
times more efficacious than those 
enjoyed by national law. What is more, 
in this arena of relentless struggle, just 
as within the state itself, law is a 
condition of continued survival and a 
system for reconciling sharply com-
petitive claims. 
I thus arrive at the core of the topic 
for this morning. If international law 
concerns the determination of those 
claims which, on the basis of expecta-
tions in the international arena, have 
become enforceable rights and those 
claims which, because of failure to 
propagate effective expectations, cannot 
yet be enforced as rights, then the 
ultimate question must be: What are the 
fundamental claims and rights which 
international law enforces in the world 
arena? 
Now claims are meaningless unless 
attached to interests of which they 
constitute the authoritative representa-
tion. But where claims have received 
recognition by generating expectations 
in the international arena, it must be 
that reciprocity of interests have pro-
duced these expectations. Reciprocity, 
therefore, lies at the base of sanctions 
and state enforcement of international 
law. In consequence, our problem be-
comes, in turn, that of identifying the 
reciprocal interests generating expecta-
tions as to claims. 
It is at this point that I return to the 
first portion of my remarks where I 
stressed the deep-seated and all-
pervasive dichotomy of claims and in-
terests as between the great and the 
small states. At the same time we must 
remain aware of the inversion of power 
which effectively prevents the great 
powers from dismissing the interests and 
claims of the small states. The vast 
strength of the great powers alone 
suffices to propagate throughout the 
world arena expectations and recogni-
tion of their claims. On the other hand, 
inversion of power provides fertile soil 
for the growth of expectations among 
great and small alike and recognition in 
the world arena of the claims of the 
small states. 
It is obvious that the interests and 
claims which, for convenience, we may 
call the objectives of the great and of 
the small states in this vast dichotomy 
must be divergent. Yet, because of the 
inversion of power, divergence of objec-
tives must be accepted in this world 
arcna. 
What, then, are the respective objec-
tivcs of the great and the small states? 
There are those who assert that 
objectives of all states constitute a vast 
spectrum running from "power," 
"wealth," "enlightenment," and 
"hcalth," to "human dignity," "recti-
tude," and "affection," whatever these 
terms could mean. Others talk of the 
"protective principle," "passive per-
sonality," etc. However again, I think it 
important that we persist in getting 
down to ultimates within the context of 
this vast dichotomy. I would suggest, on 
the one hand, the interests and claims of 
the great powers proceed from an objec-
tive or goal which is that of freedom of 
communications. These are interests and 
claims which, by and large, are mutually 
shared among them, which have propa-
gated expectations in the international 
arena even on the part of the small 
states and which have, therefore, be-
come rights under international law. On 
the other hand, the interest and claims 
of the small states proceed from an 
opposed objective or goal which is that 
of national security. These interests and 
claims and this objective are, by and 
large, mutually shared among the small 
states and through the inversion of 
power have received recognition in the 
international arena even on the part of 
the great powers. Indeed, the great 
powers themselves share this objective 
to a lesser degree. These interests, 
claims, and objectives have likewise be-
come rights under international law. 
We are, therefore, faced in interna-
tional law, as in national law, with a 
dichotomy or polarity as between the 
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objectives of the great and the small 
states. Professor McDougal has lucidly 
pointed to this pervasive polarity to 
which he assigns the term "comple-
mentarity," and which he illustrates by 
the polarity or complementarity in our 
own constitutional law between Federal 
and State rights. The rights of the 
Federal and the State Governments, 
although basically opposed, are, never-
theless, both accepted in the national 
arena of competing rights and are, 
hence, complementary. In fact, they 
overlap to a degree. We have the same 
type of problem in the international 
arena, and, in fact, there is, as in 
national law, a shared complementarity. 
Let me start first with the middle-
sized and small states and their concern 
with national security. They have few 
nationals abroad. They have few ships 
flying their flags on the high seas or in 
foreign ports. They have fewer national 
airlines operating abroad. Far from 
seeking additional air traffic rights 
abroad, they are primarily concerned 
with restricting the demands of foreign 
carriers to operate into and out of their 
national territories. Freedom of travel 
and communication is not their princi-
pal preoccupation. 
Given their limited resources, their 
concern is largely with preserving their 
own territorial integrity, particularly 
those states which have just entered the 
world arena. And so to translate this 
phrase "national security" into another 
term more conveniently manageable by 
us throughout the course, we can talk 
about the objective (which includes the 
interests and claims) of "territorial juris-
diction." National security, in effect, 
can in most cases be squared to terri-
torial jurisdiction. We will see that the 
states that do make such claims are 
largely concerned with three things: 
territorial integrity, including sanctity 
of frontiers; exclusive jurisdiction over 
all foreign nationals and interests on 
their territories; and political inde-
pendence. In essence this means that the 
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objectives of national security cause 
these states to stress repeatedly the 
concept of "nonintervention." They do 
not care too much about what happens 
abroad. Having few nationals, ships, 
airlines, and other interests overseas, 
they are inevitably less upset with what 
happens to them than are the great 
powers who, on the contrary, have, 
relatively speaking, many nationals and 
interests subject to and hostages of the 
territorial jurisdiction of the small 
states. 
We see this concern with territorial 
jurisdiction reflected in many ways. The 
states newly emerged from colonial 
empires accept without protest inequit-
able and unrealistic frontiers inherited 
from the colonial era lest they impair 
their own territorial integrity by seem-
ing to redefine them. All the emerging 
states have come out for the principle of 
self-determination at the United Nations 
in terms of the achievement of inde-
pendence. But once they have obtained 
their independence, they are quite as 
resolutely opposed to that same princi-
ple. They protest that it flies in the face 
of their own territorial integrity. Look 
at the declared position of the newly 
emerged African states, Congo and 
Nigeria in particular, and of the Organi-
zation of African Unity when con-
fronted by secession movements based 
on local internal self-determination. 
Territorial jurisdiction finds perhaps 
its most striking manifestation when 
applied to the territorial or marginal 
seas. By and large, an inverse ratio is 
involved. The smaller the navy of a 
state, the smaller its merchant marine, 
the wider its territorial water claims-in 
some cases in excess of 200 miles. This 
claim of territorial jurisdiction runs 
counter to the objective of the great 
powers which is freedom of communica-
tions, including freedom of navigation. 
As I will have occasion later to point 
out, the 3-mile limit is not an obsolete 
concept despite its venerable origins-far 
from it. Quite obviously, extension of 
territorial waters can only be at the 
expense of freedom of navigation, par-
ticularly in those nearly 200 critical 
areas of the world constituted by inter-
national straits. Were the 3-mile limit 
doubled to 6 miles, over three-fourths 
of those straits would become territorial 
waters, and were that distance, in turn, 
doubled to 12 miles, as is the claims of 
many states today including the Soviet 
Union, all of the international straits 
would become territorial waters. The 
recent Vilkitski Straits incident involv-
ing two U.S. icebreakers demonstrates a 
dimension of the problem. In this situa-
tion the only right under international 
law left to protect the objective of 
freedom of communication is that of 
innocent passage, and yet innocent 
passage is itself subject to the objectives 
of national security and territorial juris-
diction. Article 14 of the Geneva Con-
vention of 1958 on Territorial Waters 
declares that passage is not innocent if it 
is prejudicial to the security of the 
coastal state. This is, of course, an 
illustration of the objective of national 
security and the principle of territorial 
jursdiction. 
But let us not delude ourselves. In 
certain respects, to the extent that they 
too have their areas of vulnerability, 
even the great powers are concerned 
with territorial jurisdiction. For ex-
ample, the Soviet Union, whose navy 
and merchant marine have only in re-
cent years attained considerable propor-
tions and which, outside the satellite 
states, has few nationals or interests 
abroad, has long espoused the territorial 
jurisdiction approach, including a claim 
for wide territorial waters. Specifically, 
Khrushchev, in the famous 31 Decem-
ber 1960 speech, and Kosygin, in his 19 
June address of this year at the United 
Nations, came out for territorial in-
tegrity and sacredness of frontiers with 
specific application to the frontiers of 
East Germany and the satellite coun-
tries. Kosygin is also concerned at de-
fending the immutability of the 
frontiers with China established under 
the Tsarist Regime. 
And the United States. We have also 
areas of vulnerability where we invoke 
territorial jurisdiction-for example, 
Berlin. We cannot conceivably resort to 
a nuclear exchange with the Soviets over 
Berlin. Consequently, we have anchored 
our position on territorial jurisdiction-
specifically our territorial rights as an 
occupying powcr. Had we not had this 
legal argument available to us, we would 
have been subjected to even further 
applications of the "salami" tactics 
which have plagued our position with 
rcgard to access to Berlin. International 
law has been our shield in a scenario of 
nuclear stalemate. 
But the United States also in other 
areas finds itself vulnerable. For ex-
ample: our fishing industry is far from 
bcing dominant in the world today. The 
result is that although we come out 
fully for the freedom of the seas and the 
narrowest possible territorial waters, we 
enacted, in November of last year, 
legislation extending to 12 miles the 
bclt of waters reserved exclusively for 
U.S. fishing interests. 
I now turn to the objectives, claims, 
and interests of the great powers. 
The concept of territorial jurisdiction 
favored by the small states has been 
under increasing attack in recent years 
by those great powers who tend to favor 
the competing form of jurisdiction 
based on the objective of freedom of 
communication and which we can trans-
late into the term "nationality jurisdic-
tion." J urisdietion based on nationality 
reflects the claims, interests, and objec-
tives of those great powers which have 
many nationals abroad, many naval 
forces on the high seas, many merchant 
ships under their flags, many airlines 
and aircraft operating abroad under 
their jurisdiction, responsibility, and 
protection, as well as many investments 
abroad. To meet such responsibilities 
abroad, a continuing link of nationality 
is indispensable. These great powers 
31 
extol less than do the small states the 
virtues of nonintervention and are more 
interested in protecting, under a juris-
diction based on nationality, the free 
movement of their nationals, ships, air-
craft, and investments. 
Let me offer you, first, an extreme 
example of this type of jurisdiction. It 
would seem normal that an American 
could go to Italy and conclude a con-
tract with the Italian Government grant-
ing him exclusive rights in Italy for the 
marketing of American farm equipment. 
Yet, such is not the case. The U.S. 
Government would reach out through 
the arm of nationality to declare that 
the American, even abroad, would be 
violating our antitrust legislation and 
would be liable to criminal prosecution 
and penalties in the States. 
This concern with the objective of 
freedom of communications and juris-
diction based on nationality finds its 
clearest expression in respect of 
freedom of navigation on the high seas. 
We demand the right to move through-
out the world with the narrowest pos-
sible restrictions on freedom of the seas. 
Indeed, we even claim that freedom of 
communications is a form of national 
security for us. We find it advantageous 
that our surface vessels and our aircraft 
should be able to move for surveillance 
and other purposes, including national 
defense, up to the 3-mile limit rather 
than be held off at the 12-mile limit off 
the shores of other states as the RB-47 
incident in the White Sea of a decade 
ago illustrated. 
The United States is not alone in 
stressing freedom of communications 
and nationality jurisdiction. Of course a 
state like Japan, with its large fishing 
fleet and merchant marine, by and large, 
follows the same general approach to 
problems of international law. I would 
suggest, finally, on this point, that the 
Soviets with the growth in their sea-
power and merchant marine might 
possibly be evolving gradually from ter-
ri torial jurisdiction based on the 
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objective of national security to na-
tionality jurisdiction based on the objec-
tive of freedom of communications. 
Perhaps the word "communications" 
might eventually come to take on the 
additional meanings that strategists such 
as Professors Kissinger and Schelling 
impute to it within the context of 
communications between nuclear an-
tagonists. 
So this is the clash between the two 
forms of jurisdiction-the one pursued 
by the small states and based on terri-
tory, the other the objective of the great 
powers, namely, freedom of communi-
cation and based on nationality. 
I wish, in the closing minutes of this 
introduction to international law, to 
illustrate this confrontation between 
and the complementarity of rights of 
the great and the small states under 
international law by turning to the 
current crisis in the Middle East. 
You may remember that in 1957, 
after the 1956 crisis, the United Nations 
established two UNEF posts in U.A.R. 
territory at Sharm of Sheikh and at Ras 
Nasrani on the Sinai Peninsula near the 
Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba 
at a distance of more than 90 miles 
from the frontier between the U.A.R. 
and Israel. The purpose was to dissuade 
the U.A.R. from reinstituting its block-
ade of the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf 
of Aqaba and to reaffirm the principles 
of freedom of the seas and of innocent 
passage. By so doing, the United Na-
tions was demonstrating the importance 
which it attached to assuring freedom of 
communications and freedom of passage 
through the Straits of Tiran and the 
Gulf of Aqaba. The removal of these 
two U.N. posts at Nasser's insistence in 
May of this year constituted, therefore, 
an immediate and direct threat to the 
very principle of freedom of communi-
cations which had led to their establish-
ment a decade ago. Accordingly, on the 
26th of May, U-Thant delivered a 
memorandum to President Nasser point-
ing out that this demand would have the 
most destructive effect possible on 
peace in the Middle East. 
Three days before that, President 
Johnson had made a statement on the 
same point, declaring the right of free 
innocent passage on the international 
waterways is a vital interest of the 
international community. (I see that 
others prefer the term "world com-
." "ld ') Th mumty to wor arena. ere 
emerged, in consequence, a confronta-
tion between the demands of the 
U.A.R. for national security and those 
of the United States for freedom of 
navigation. The passage through the 
Straits was clearly within U.A.R. terri-
torial waters since the only navigable 
channel, that between the Sinai Penin-
sula and the Island of Tiran, is but 
I-mile wide. The sole exception to 
territorial jurisdiction here would be 
under the international law privilege of 
innocent passage. On this point the 
U.A.R. argued, among other things, that 
the passage of vessels through the Straits 
would, under article 14 of the Geneva 
Convention that I have mentioned, be 
prejudicial to the security of the coastal 
state. 
The problem was raised before the 
Security Council, and after a pre-
liminary period of sparring, the debate 
was initiated by none other than the 
U.A.R. Representative who delivered a 
searching legal analysis of the problem. 
This speech has been somewhat played 
down by the American press, fascinated 
and awed as it has been by the rhetoric 
and logic of the Israeli Foreign Minister, 
Abba Eban. But the entire address, 
many pages long, was a juridical analysis 
which, in turn, launched a juridical 
dispute that lasted for days. 
It is true that this protracted dispute 
concerned freedom of navigation 
through straits through which passed 
only 7 percent of Israel's seaborne 
commerce. However, by the admissions 
of both sides, deeper issues and prece-
dents of international law were in-
volved-the confrontations between the 
two legitimate objectives of national 
security, which U-Thant conceded to 
the U.A.R., and of freedom of com-
munications. These issues could not be 
avoided. The United States was con-
cerned lest a flagging in the resolve to 
dcfend the latter might comport serious 
precedents for other more important 
international straits. For example, just 
as the U.A.R. claims that the Gulf of 
Aqaba is an historic bay which can be 
closed to all but the coastal powers 
(from which it excludes Israel), so the 
Soviet Union argues that the Baltic 
should be considered a closed sea to 
which access can be had only through 
the mile-wide Straits of Skagerrak. Even 
without that claim the Soviet Union 
could bring pressure to bear in Denmark 
and Sweden to deny innocent passage 
on the grounds that such passage could 
be prejudicial to the security of the 
Soviet Union which, in turn, could 
cause them misgivings as to their own 
national security. 
Following the outbreak of hostilities 
and the stalemate in the Security Coun-
cil, the problem was handed over to the 
General Assembly. This time most of 
the debates turned on the highly legal-
istic claim of belligerency advanced by 
the U.A.R. which declared that since 
1947 it had remained at war with Israel. 
The purpose of the claim was to justify 
the blockade of the Straits and the Gulf 
and to disclaim responsibility for any 
new aggression by such a blockade since 
the U.A.R. and Israel had, since 1947, 
been at war. It was even argued that the 
United States, which had "blockaded" 
Cuba in 1962 without claiming belliger-
ency, was scarcely in a position to 
object to a blockade imposed by a state 
such as the U.A.R. which had been 
frank in invoking its rights under inter-
national law as a belligerent Thus, in 
the Security Council the line of battle 
was drawn between the rules of interna-
tional law relating to territorial integrity 
and those concerning freedom of the 
seas. In the General Assembly the ulti-
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mate issue was whether or not freedom 
of the seas was to be restricted by the 
rights of a belligerent under interna-
tional law. As you may recall, that body 
failed to reach a solution precisely 
because of the demands of the Arab 
State to retain the rights of belligerents 
and the insistence of the Western World 
upon their rights under international 
law for freedom of the seas. 
Now in this situation some of you 
may say, "Well, does not this all prove 
that international law is doing us a 
disservice in such a situation? Far from 
providing it has stultified a solution of 
the problem. " 
In response, I would remark, first, 
that you are possibly attributing a more 
decisive role to international law in that 
situation than do the lawyers them-
selves. It is doubtful that international 
law could claim so crucial an influence 
in frustrating a settlement, if, indeed, 
that was its objective. However, the fact 
that the vocabulary and the discussion 
of issues of international law clearly 
dominated all the debates at both the 
Security Council and the General 
Assembly validates two conclusions. 
One is the importance of becoming 
familiar with the sophisticated dialogue 
and terminology of international law, if 
one is to gain a comprehension of the 
critical events and movements on the 
world scene today. The other conclu-
sion is that preoccupation with the legal 
issues demonstrated that international 
law is deeply concerned with the ulti-
mate problems of our time, whereas, the 
proliferation of political issues-and 
there were many of them transpiercing 
this crisis-in the end tend to cancel 
each other out. Concerned as it is with 
the two equally valid objectives of 
national security and freedom of com-
munications, international law can, in 
the end, offer a valid and sophisticated 
balance between competing national in-
terests, claims, and objectives, not only 
in terms of the struggle between Israel 
and the Arab States, hut also in its 
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implications for other areas of the 
world. 
These, gentlemen, are some of the 
problems that in the course of the 
coming lectures we will be examining 
and pondering. It is my hope that you 
may come away from them with a 
sharper and, I would venture to suggest, 
deeper insight into some of the issues 
that are troubling our times. 
----- tft -----
